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## information report

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Greece/Yugoslavia/Albania COUNTRY

Talks Between Vasilios Bartziotas and

Demetrios Partsalides

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PLACE **ACQUIRED** 

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- Several meetings were held between Vasilios Bartziotas (member of the KKE Politburo and of the Rebel Junta) and Demetrios Partsalides (member of the Polithuro stationed in Athens) during the course of the former's visit to that city from 4 - 11 March 1949. The following matters were discussed.
- 2. Bartzictas declared that it had been the intention of the Politburo to have Ioannis Ioannides, President of the Rebel Junta and member of the Politburo, visit Athens in February 1949, in order to analyze the decisions of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of KKE for the senior Party officials in the area. However, the reverse of the Florina battle in mid-February 1949 had seriously disorganized and demoralized the Rebel Army, and it had therefore been essential for Toannides, as President of the Rebel Junta, to remain at Vitsi to supervise the reorganization and strengthening of the morale of the Rabel forces.
- 3. As far as the Macedonian question was concerned, the general KKE line and policy in regard to the Rebel Army had been fully accepted by all "in the mountains"; however, there had been a number of disagreements on the Macedonian issue on the part of Rebel Army officers who had served in ELAS during the occupation years, and from Greek residents in Macedonia. This reaction had been stopped, and the dissenters greatly cowed, by the swift intervention of General Zachariades in his bold move against Chryssa Hadjivassiliou and General Markos.
- KKE's relations with NOF had recently greatly improved, and as a result of elaborate maneuvering the Party had managed to gain a number of NOF officials who had until now been very strongly influenced by General Peter Gotsev and Koulisev.
- Referring to Mose Pijade's article in Borba, the Yugoslav newspaper, on the decisions taken at the Second Plenary Session of NOF, Bartziotas said that Pijade's comments were expected and true to form; however, Zachariades had been very successful in drawing eway from Pijade some outstanding officials of NOF in Yugoslavia, and had even managed to get Akronafpliotes (fnu a Greek Communist imprisoned during the Metaxas regime and the occupation years) appointed as a member of the Central Bureau of NOF in Yugoslavia.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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- 6. A large number of anti-Tito Slavo-Macedonians and idealists believing in a united independent "Macedonian Democracy" were now members of NOF, and the Party believed that the influence of Tito and his followers in NOF would be eradicated during the coming year.
- 7. So far there had been no open reaction on the part of Tito and the Tugoslav Communist Party to the decisions of the Fifth Plenary Session of KKE; however, a propaganda offensive had been started by Gotsev's Slavo-Macedonians at Skoplje; this little show of activity, however, might only be a passing reaction.
- 8. KKE relations with General Enver Hoxha of Albania were excellent, better than they had ever been in the past.
- 9. KKE, and General Zachariades in particular, felt that Tito's star was on the wane. Anti-Tito regime refugees were pouring into Free Greece and were being rapidly organized, under the auspices of KKE, for the creation of an anti-Tito partisan movement in Yugoslavia. It was of course realized that, when Tito discovered that this movement had the support of KKE, he would sever all connections with the Party, which would also probably mean that he would cease to aid the Rebel Army. However, the Politburo of KKE hoped that by then the anti-Tito partisan movement would be well on the way, and that the game would prove worthwhile.
- 10. Partsalides stated that the decisions of the Fifth Plenary Session had not gone down too badly in Party circles in the Athens area; however, Right Wing propaganda and the breaking away of the Socialist Party Union of Popular Democracy (SK-ELD) and the Left Liberals: Group (OAPh) had shaken a number of members, and the Party decisions affecting Macedonia were being critized in some quarters.\* Partsalides remarked that, in his opinion, these Party decisions would have gone down better if there had been the opportunity to "enlighten" members in advance on the subject.
- 11. Bartziotas concluded discussion on the subject of Macedonia by instructing Partsalides to find a means of counter-acting the effect of extremist statements by NOF on Macedonia.

Comment: See paragraph 3.

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